中国人民银行办公厅


中国人民银行办公厅关于对金融机构外汇业务监管职责划分的通知
中国人民银行办公厅




外汇局、银行一司、银行二司、非银行司、合作司：
按照国务院关于机构改革的精神，国家外汇管理局（以下简称外汇局）将金融机构外汇业务市场准入审批职能以及对金融机构外币资产质量和风险监管职能移交给中国人民银行（以下简称人行）。以上职能移交后，外汇局仍保留对金融机构外汇业务的监管职责。现就人行和外汇局对金
融机构外汇业务的监管职责分工通知如下：
一、对金融机构执行国际收支统计申报制度的监管。
外汇局负责根据国际收支统计申报办法监督金融机构执行国际收支统计制度，并按照规定向人行提供国际收支统计数据。
二、对金融机构在外汇交易市场交易活动的监管。
人行通过与金融机构协商，制定交易风险监管模型；外汇局负责监管金融机构在外汇交易市场的交易行为及有关外汇市场的发育、成长及相关事宜。
三、对金融机构办理国际结算、结售汇、外汇汇款、外币兑换等业务的监管。
人行负责监管金融机构在经营国际结算业务中的风险状况，将金融机构的国际结算业务纳入授信管理；外汇局负责监管金融机构办理国际结算、结售汇、外汇汇款、外币兑换及办理进口核销中执行外汇管理政策法规的情况。
四、对金融机构资本项目交易活动，如境外借款、发债、境外投资（包括直接投资和间接投资）、担保等的监管。
人行负责金融机构境外借款、发债的政策协调和统一金融机构有关信用评级问题的对外口径；外汇局负责金融机构境外借款、发债的具体审批；包括制定合同规范，审核金融条件，协调发行市场，境外投资资金的汇出审批，对外担保的审批和外债的统计监测等。
五、对金融机构境外帐户开立和使用的监管。
外汇局负责审批非银行金融机构在境外开立帐户，审核各银行总行制定的境外帐户管理办法，并对金融机构使用境外帐户的收支情况是否符合外汇管理法规进行检查。
六、对金融机构外币资本金和营运资金调整的监管。
人行负责审批金融机构资本金或营运资金作本外币币种调整；对银行本外币调整金额在2000万美元以上、非银行金融机构调整金额在1000万美元以上的，事先征得外汇局的同意；近期内逐笔商议。
外汇局负责对外汇指定银行外汇结售汇周转头寸的调整和监管。
七、对金融机构外汇从业人员考核。
人行负责对证券公司和保险公司以外的金融机构外汇从业人员进行考核。考核内容由人民银行监管司局与外汇局共同制定，以人行为主，涉及外汇方面的，由外汇局制定。对证券公司和保险公司外汇从业人员的考核由外汇局负责。
八、对金融机构外汇业务检查。
对于金融机构外汇业务的全面检查以及风险监控方面的检查，由人行负责；如涉及对金融机构处罚，应在处罚之前商外汇局，以便协调政策。对于金融机构外汇业务经营中执行外汇管理政策法规情况的监督检查和处罚，由外汇局负责；处罚中涉及停业外汇业务经营权的，由外汇局提供
材料和意见转请人行发处罚通知。检查和处罚情况以及发现的金融机构在日常外汇业务中发现的违规问题应互相沟通。
九、人行和外汇局在制订涉及金融机构外汇业务的法规时，事先互相征求对方意见并相互抄送；同时加强双方对金融机构外汇业务监管的信息交流和沟通，共同做好金融监管外汇业务监管工作。
十、人行在审批金融机构开办外汇业务时要考虑该机构整体上遵守外汇管理政策和法规的情况。
十一、金融机构统计报表。
外汇局可根据汇兑管理和国际收支统计的需要，编制并要求金融机构报送外汇业务报表，同时要求金融机构将外汇业务报表抄报总行。
十二、外汇局负责保险公司、证券公司的外汇业务市场准入审批及其外币资产质量和风险监管。



1998年10月20日
Chapter Ⅲ
Initiation of Panel Procedures


OUTLINE

Section One Role of Consultations: Art. 4
I The Importance of Consultations
II Issues Concerning the “adequacy” of Consultations
Section Two Establishment of Panels: Art. 6.2
I Introduction
II Indication of Consultations Process
III Identification of “the specific measures at issue”
IV Provision of “a brief summary of the legal basis of the complaint”
V Concluding Remarks
Section Three Terms of Reference of Panels: Art. 7
I Introduction
II Effect of Consultations on Terms of Reference of Panels
III The “matter referred to the DSB”
Section Four The Mandate of Compliance Panels: Art. 21.5
I Introduction
II Clarification of “measures taken to comply”
III Perspective of Review under Art.21.5
IV Examination of the New Measure in Its Totality and in Its Application
Section Five Third Party Rights : Art. 10
I Introduction
II Generic Third Party Rights: Interpretation of Art. 10.3
III Extended Third Party Rights: Exercise of Panels’ Discretion
IV Summary and Conclusions





Section One
Role of Consultations: Art. 4

The procedures for consultations under the WTO, significantly different from the procedures for good offices, conciliation or mediation as prescribed in Art. 5 of the DSU which remains voluntary options if the parties to the dispute so agree, remains a mandatory first step in the dispute settlement process as embodied with text of Art. 4 of the DSU. However, as to be shown below, there is something to be clarified so as to understand appropriately the role of consultations under the WTO dispute settlement mechanism.

I The Importance of Consultations
The practice of GATT contracting parties in regularly holding consultations is testimony to the important role of consultations in dispute settlement. Art. 4.1 of the DSU recognizes this practice and further provides that: “Members affirm their resolve to strengthen and improve the effectiveness of the consultation procedures employed by Members.” A number of reports made by panels or by the Appellate Body under the WTO have recognized the value of consultations within the dispute settlement process.
As noted by a panel, Members’ duty to consult concerns a matter with utmost seriousness: “Compliance with the fundamental obligation of WTO Members to enter into consultations where a request is made under the DSU is vital to the operation of the dispute settlement system. Article 4.2 of the DSU provides that ‘[e]ach Member undertakes to accord sympathetic consideration to and afford adequate opportunity for consultation regarding any representations made by another Member concerning measures affecting the operation of any covered agreement taken within the territory of the former’. Moreover, pursuant to Article 4.6 of the DSU, consultations are ‘without prejudice to the rights of any Member in any further proceedings’. In our view, these provisions make clear that Members' duty to consult is absolute, and is not susceptible to the prior imposition of any terms and conditions by a Member.” 1
Another panel addresses the essence of consultations, and they rule there that: “Indeed, in our view, the very essence of consultations is to enable the parties gather correct and relevant information, for purposes of assisting them in arriving at a mutually agreed solution, or failing which, to assist them in presenting accurate information to the panel.”2
The Appellate Body confirms panels’ rulings in this respect. For example, the Appellate Body stresses those benefits afforded by consultations to the dispute settlement system in Mexico-HFCS（DS132）（21.5）as: “[…] Through consultations, parties exchange information, assess the strengths and weaknesses of their respective cases, narrow the scope of the differences between them and, in many cases, reach a mutually agreed solution in accordance with the explicit preference expressed in Article 3.7 of the DSU. Moreover, even where no such agreed solution is reached, consultations provide the parties an opportunity to define and delimit the scope of the dispute between them. Clearly, consultations afford many benefits to complaining and responding parties, as well as to third parties and to the dispute settlement system as a whole.”3

II Issues Concerning the “adequacy” of Consultations
As noted above, the procedures for consultations remain a mandatory first step in the dispute settlement process under the WTO. However, does it mean that there is a requirement for the adequacy of consultations before initiating a panel proceeding?
With regard to this issue, on the one hand, the Panel on Alcoholic Beverages (DS75/DS84) finds that, “the WTO jurisprudence so far has not recognized any concept of ‘adequacy’ of consultations”, the Panel Report reads in pertinent part:4
“In our view, the WTO jurisprudence so far has not recognized any concept of ‘adequacy’ of consultations. The only requirement under the DSU is that consultations were in fact held, or were at least requested, and that a period of sixty days has elapsed from the time consultations were requested to the time a request for a panel was made. What takes place in those consultations is not the concern of a panel. The point was put clearly by the Panel in Bananas III, where it was stated:
‘Consultations are […] a matter reserved for the parties. The DSB is not involved; no panel is involved; and the consultations are held in the absence of the Secretariat. While a mutually agreed solution is to be preferred, in some cases it is not possible for parties to agree upon one. In those cases, it is our view that the function of a panel is only to ascertain that the consultations, if required, were in fact held. […]’